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Abstract
Introduction
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in
terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohl-
bergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reason-
ing, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have
directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity.
Objectives
Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model or 3-fac-
tor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment
development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral
judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-
stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers
the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlber-
gian theory.
Methods
We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confir-
matory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2
manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor
CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal
interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included
the SGMJ in addition to the three factors.
Results
In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA
model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices.
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Conclusion
We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning
development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-
stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development,
can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study.
Introduction
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) assesses how one defines the moral issues in a social problem
[1–4]. Its theoretical framework is grounded on the theory of moral judgment development
proposed by Kohlberg [5]. In the original version of the Kohlbergian model, the process of
moral judgment development was explained in terms of three levels: the pre-conventional,
conventional, and postconventional. One’s level of moral judgment can be explained accord-
ing to which moral philosophical rationale is employed while making moral judgments [6].
Those at the pre-conventional level are likely to make a moral decision based on the possibility
of being punished or obtaining personal benefits. At the conventional level, a person tends to
behave in a way that maintains a good relationship with others or social norms. Finally, a per-
son who is situated at the postconventional level can critically evaluate the justifiability of exist-
ing laws and social norms based on universal moral principles. According to Kohlbergian
theory, the most developed and sophisticated level of moral judgment is the postconventional
level. Previous research has shown the presence of the higher level to be associated with moral
motivation and behavior ([7]).
However, Neo-Kohlbergians, who revised the original Kohlbergian model, argued that
although people generally tend to follow the developmental trajectory proposed by Kohlberg,
they do not always rely on only one level of moral philosophical rationale while making moral
judgments [1]. For instance, a person with highly developed moral reasoning does not always
make moral judgments based on rationale at the post-conventional level. Instead, despite
being more likely to use the post-conventional rationale, the person occasionally might refer to
rationale from the pre-conventional or conventional level. As a way to cope with this limita-
tion, the Neo-Kohlbergians proposed the soft-stage model, which differs from Kohlberg’s orig-
inal hard-stage model. According to this model, the development of moral judgment happens
gradually, rather than like a discontinuous quantum jump between two stages, which was pro-
posed in the original Kohlbergian theory [1]. The traditional Kohlbergian researchers were pri-
marily interested in how transitions between levels (or stages) occur within persons, whereas
Neo-Kohlbergians attempted to explain the process of moral judgment development in terms
of how frequently the rationale based on the postconventional level is employed in moral deci-
sion-making across situations.
The Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2)
The first DIT, the DIT-1, was developed based on the Neo-Kohlbergians’ soft-stage model,
and measures one’s development of moral judgment in terms of the likelihood of the utiliza-
tion of the postconventional schema [3]. Compared with the Moral Judgment Interview [8],
which was developed based on the original Kohlbergian model and required extensive inter-
views for data collection, the DIT can be administered more easily because it is a paper-and-
pencil test [1]. The DIT quantifies one’s likelihood to utilize each individual schema (e.g., the
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utilization of the postconventional level from 0 to 100%). It was designed to measure the likeli-
hood of three schemas: personal-interest, maintaining-norms, and postconventional schemas.
Given that it is feasible to implement and that it provides a quantified score of moral judgment
development, the DIT has been widely used across different fields by researchers and educators
to examine the trajectory of moral judgment development or to evaluate outcomes of moral
educational programs (see [9] for the overview and https://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/about-
the-dit.html for a list of studies applying the DIT).
Previous studies reported that the DIT measured three specific schemas of moral reasoning:
the personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas using universal
moral principles [1,4,10–12]. Those who prefer the personal-interests schema are likely to
focus on their personal stake and close personal relationships, and are likely to place less value
on social norms and conventions. Those who prioritize the maintaining-norms schema tend
to value existing social norms and conventions, thereby emphasizing a society-wide perspec-
tive. Those who tend to utilize the postconventional schema are likely to believe that “moral
obligations are to be based on shared ideals, which are reciprocal and are open to debate and
tests of logical consistency, and on the experience of the community” ([1], p. 307).
Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, and Anderson [13] devised the DIT, and Rest, Narvaez,
Thoma, and Bebeau revised it into the DIT-2 [2]. Unlike the DIT-1, which reports the score of
the likelihood of the utilization of each individual schema, the outcome score of the DIT-2, the
N2 score, demonstrates one’s overall moral judgment development. The N2 score is calculated
based on whether items corresponding to the postconventional schema are selected with
higher priority than those corresponding to the personal-interests or maintaining-norms sche-
mas [2]. Hence, in terms of consistency with the Neo-Kohlbergian theory, the DIT-2 would be
more consistent than the DIT-1, given how the N2 score is calculated. The full measure and
scoring information is available from the Center for the Study of Ethical Development. Infor-
mation about the measure and scoring can be found at: https://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/
about-the-dit.html.
The DIT has been tested and validated in various previous studies (see [14]). They have
demonstrated that the DIT score possesses good predictive, convergent and divergent validity
[9]. For instance, the DIT score is significantly changed by moral education and significantly
predicts moral behavior (predictive validity), is significantly correlated with relevant cognitive
and personality measures (convergent validity) and is significantly distinguishable from sur-
veyed political orientations (divergent validity).
However, although the external validity of the DIT has been tested repeatedly, its internal
validity, meaning whether or not its internal structure, which indicates construct validity, is
well supported by data, has not been thoroughly tested in previous studies. Only a few prior
studies have examined some aspects of the internal validity of the DIT. Several researchers
conducting the previous validity studies [10,15,16] used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with
the principal component extraction method for the DIT-1; however, the DIT-2 has not been
explored in this manner. A recent study evaluated the DIT-1 and DIT-2 with the item response
theory [17]. Although van den Enden, Boom, Brugman, and Thoma reported results that sup-
ported the developmental structure of the DIT, they assumed that each level or each stage
exists independent from the others. Another recent study tested the differential item function-
ing of the behavioral DIT [18], a revised version of the DIT that was designed for use in behav-
ioral experiments [19]. As in the first study, the authors also assumed that the three schemas
exist in the model as three independent factors. Although both these studies examined the
multi-factor structure of the DIT, they did not perform confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to
directly evaluate its internal structure and validity.
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The present study
The purpose of this study was to validate the internal structure of DIT-2, which has not been
well studied. Thus, we performed CFA based on the ordinary multi-factor model and bi-factor
model to investigate the internal structure of DIT-2. Although the previous studies examined
the internal structure of DIT-2 indirectly, they basically assumed that the three schemas were
independent from each other as three factors; in other words, the previous analyses seemingly
were based on the multi-factor model. Given that DIT-2 and the N2 score are conceptually
grounded in the soft-stage model, which considers moral judgment development as a continu-
ous process, testing the validity of DIT-2 with the multi-factor assumption, assuming that
three schemas exist as three individual factors, would not be completely appropriate. Instead, a
validity test should be based on the assumption that moral judgment development occurs con-
tinuously and a latent factor might well conceptually describe such a continuous development.
A bi-factor model assumes the existence of a general factor (G) that is explained by all items
in addition to multiple individual latent factors in the structure of a measure [20]. The general
factor assumes that all items in the measure explain one unidimensional factor as well as
lower-level individual factors [21]. Given that the bi-factor model includes a unidimensional
factor, it would be more consistent with the concept of the soft-stage model, which constitutes
the conceptual basis of DIT-2. If three schemas exist in the form of a continuum as proposed
by the soft-stage model, then it would be more plausible to examine the continuum as one uni-
fied dimension (as assumed in the bi-factor model) instead of three independent schemas.
Although the bi-factor model seems similar to the higher-order model, which assumes that the
relationships between items and the general factor are mediated by individual latent factors
[20], we decided to employ the bi-factor model in our study because it is more conceptually
coherent with the soft-stage model. The soft-stage model assumes that moral judgment devel-
opment occurs continuously; thus, it would be reasonable to assume that all individual items
have direct relations with the general factor if the factor is supposed to explain such a continu-
ous developmental trend.
Next, we intended to compare model fit indicators between the bi-factor and ordinary
multi-factor models to examine whether the bi-factor model is empirically better than the
multi-factor model and if the soft-stage model can be better supported empirically. Given that
the hypothetical general factor in our bi-factor model used to examine the DIT-2 was assumed
to be the continuous development of moral judgment across different schemas (or levels), we
used the term, Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), to explain the nature of the general
factor in our study.
Method
DIT-2 scale
Five different moral dilemmas, or stories, about social problems were presented to the stu-
dents, who were then asked to answer 12 five-point Likert-type questions (1 = no, 2 = little,
3 = some, 4 = much, 5 = great) and four ranking questions per story in order to measure what
was important to them in decision-making about the social problem. The five dilemmas were
labeled “Famine,” “Reporter,” “School Board,” “Cancer,” and “Demonstration.” Nine of the
total of 60 Likert-type questions were used to detect unreliable participants. Although ranking
responses were also used to create a total score, only 51 Likert-type questions were used for fac-
tor analysis. An example question is “Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody
else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her?” Three specific schemas of moral
reasoning (the personal interests (PI) schema, the maintaining norms (MN) schema and the
PLOS ONE Validity study using factor analyses on DIT-2
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110 August 31, 2020 4 / 18
postconventional (P) schema) were measured by patterns of ratings and rankings. Because the
DIT-2 is protected by copyright, requests for access to the full scale should be addressed to the
Center for the Study of Ethical Development (https://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/about-the-
dit.html).
Sample
We used the DIT-2 datasets provided by a third-party research center, the Center for the Study
of Ethical Development at the University of Alabama. The samples were collected from under-
graduate students in the United States between 2000 and 2009 (N = 44,742). To prevent culture
and language bias, only students who were US citizens and used English as their primary lan-
guage were selected. Ages ranged from 17 to 26; 47.2% of participants were male (n = 21,139)
and 52% were female (n = 23,272). Regarding class year, 34.7% of the sample were seniors,
20.6% were juniors, 13.7% were sophomores, and 31.0% were freshmen. Total sample size for
the factor analyses was 39,409 after the listwise deletion method was applied for handling miss-
ing values. Similar to the case of the full DIT-2 scale, the Center for the Study of Ethical Devel-
opment retains the right to use the datasets, and requests for access to the datasets should be
addressed to the center. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development is the repository of
all raw DIT-2 data. These data are also available for use by researchers for secondary analyses.
The DIT-2 datasets were collected by various researchers around the country, submitted for
scoring to the Center for the Study of Ethical Development at The University of Alabama, and
then added to the Center’s database. Because of the secondary nature of the data, IRB approval
was not obtained for the present study.
Confirmatory factor analyses
Two different types of factor analyses were performed to evaluate the factor structures using
SAS 9.4 statistical software: 3-factor CFA and bi-factor model (see Figs 1 and 2). Each item was
assumed to measure one of three specific schemas of moral reasoning (i.e., PI, MN and P sche-
mas). According to the DIT-2 Guide [22], the 51 rating items were assigned in the following
manner, 20 PI items, 17 MN items, and 14 P items. PI-1 to PI-4, MN-1 to MN-2, and P-1 to P-
3 were assigned to Famine. PI-5 to PI-8, MN-3 to MN-6, and P-4 to P-5 were assigned to
Fig 1. Diagram for a 3-factor CFA model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.g001
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Reporter. PI-9 to PI-12, MN-7 to MN-10, and P-6 to P-8 were assigned to School Board. PI-13
to PI-16, MN-11 to MN-13, and P-9 to P-11 were assigned to Cancer. PI-17 to PI-20, MN-14
to MN-17, and P-12 to P-14 were assigned to Demonstration.
A CFA was used to assess how the hypothesized organization of a set of identified factors
fits the data. A bi-factor model was tested to check the possibility of a strong single factor (i.e.,
factor G), in addition to group factors that involve clusters of measures but are arguably sepa-
rate from the general factor. All group factors were assumed to be uncorrelated to each other
and variances of items could be explained by both group factors and the general factor in the
bi-factor model. On the other hand, in the CFA, the correlations among the group factors
were estimated and only group factors accounted for the variability of items. In our study, the
Fig 2. Diagram for a Bi-factor model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.g002
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general factor, Factor G, was considered as SGMJ development because moral development is
related to cognitive development in general [1,3,4,14,23–25]. According to Kohlberg, as cogni-
tive capacities become more advanced, reasoning about moral situations becomes less self-
focused, and therefore more developmentally advanced [1,3,4, 23].
Aligning with this perspective, Narvaez and Bock noted that individuals with more develop-
mentally advanced moral reasoning possess intricate patterns of cognitive schemas, ultimately
allowing for a greater perspective-taking ability when it comes to social decision-making [25].
Conversely, individuals with less developmentally advanced moral reasoning possess a much
simpler pattern of cognitive schemas, resulting in a narrower perspective. Supporting this rela-
tionship is a wealth of data from DIT-2 studies that indicate a positive relationship between
DIT-2 scores and cognitive capacities (reviewed as validity criteria by [2–4,14]). For example,
Rest studied moral comprehension in relation to moral judgment development [26]. Moral
comprehension refers to an individual’s cognitive ability to comprehend moral concepts. Rest
found evidence for a relationship between better moral comprehension skills and more devel-
opmentally advanced moral reasoning [26].
Moreover, based on Neo-Kohlbergian theory related to the soft-stage concept, we examined
the presence of the general factor (the G factor or SGMJ), which is based on the assumption
that moral judgment development occurs along a unidimensional continuum as proposed in
the soft-stage model, by testing whether the bi-factor model fitted data better than the ordinary
CFA model without the general factor. Unlike classical Kohlbergian theory that assumes quali-
tative transitions between different developmental levels (i.e. pre-conventional, conventional,
and postconventional), Neo-Kohlbergian theory, which constitutes the basis of the DIT-2,
argues that the development of moral judgment is continuous, quantitative, and similar to
shifting distributions of judgment across different schemas [1,27]. Because the ordinary CFA
model assumes three schemas as three independent latent factors, testing the ordinary model
with CFA would not be an ideal measure to examine the soft-stage concept. Instead, the pres-
ence of the Factor G in the bi-factor model might be evidence that supports the soft-stage con-
cept because the factor takes into account items across all three schemas and represents the
SGMJ.
Results
Descriptive statistics for the DIT-2 items and total score were presented in Table 1. The corre-
lation matrix among the all DIT-2 items was provided as a S1 File because replication studies
for CFA and bi-factor models are available using means, SDs, and correlation matrix for all
items. The Cronbach’s alpha was .840, indicating good reliability. The assumption of multivar-
iate normality on the 51 items was checked using tests of multivariate skewness and kurtosis
and the omnibus test of multivariate normality. The Small’s test, Srivastava’s test, and Mardia’s
test using DeCarlo’s SPSS macro [28] indicated that multivariate normality was violated.
The unweighted least square (ULS) estimation method was selected because it is usually
classified as a distribution-free-method and our data was not normally distributed [29]. The
three-factor variances for CFA and general factor variance for the bi-factor model were fixed
to 1.0 for scale identification [30]. This was appropriate because we usually take care of scale
identification issues by assuming that factors are in z-score form, which would mean that their
variances are 1.0 and this is what the LISREL does by default [31].
To find the acceptable model fit, four model fit indices were used: root mean square resid-
ual (RMSR), standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR), goodness-of-fit statistic (GFI),
and the adjusted goodness-of-fit statistic (AGFI). The RMSR and SRMSR values less than 0.05
suggest good fit and values up to 0.08 are deemed acceptable [32,33]. Traditionally an adequate
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the DIT-2 (N = 44,742).
Item n Mean SD
PI-1 44619 2.83 1.21
PI-2 44666 3.82 1.11
PI-3 44564 3.29 1.28
PI-4 44638 2.82 1.27
PI-5 44690 2.52 1.19
PI-6 44631 2.45 1.13
PI-7 44639 4.36 0.88
PI-8 44493 2.30 1.09
PI-9 44663 3.27 1.11
PI-10 44664 2.23 1.09
PI-11 44645 2.75 1.13
PI-12 44692 3.56 1.09
PI-13 44629 3.70 1.21
PI-14 44597 3.23 1.34
PI-15 44599 2.73 1.23
PI-16 44597 2.96 1.25
PI-17 44554 3.02 1.20
PI-18 44523 3.31 1.29
PI-19 44508 2.84 1.12
PI-20 44440 2.79 1.24
MN-1 44638 3.56 1.08
MN-2 44640 3.54 1.27
MN-3 44690 3.56 1.16
MN-4 44450 2.84 1.07
MN-5 44597 3.74 1.12
MN-6 44537 3.31 1.23
MN-7 44675 3.00 1.39
MN-8 44615 3.23 1.16
MN-9 44473 3.88 1.01
MN-10 44451 3.54 1.13
MN-11 44495 3.97 1.10
MN-12 44595 3.54 1.47
MN-13 44589 3.15 1.21
MN-14 44505 3.52 1.40
MN-15 44523 3.32 1.14
MN-16 44475 3.41 1.10
MN-17 44517 3.72 1.19
P-1 44384 3.36 1.15
P-2 44637 3.26 1.30
P-3 44612 3.26 1.23
P-4 44580 3.89 1.16
P-5 44556 3.35 1.22
P-6 44409 3.77 1.17
P-7 44476 3.81 1.05
P-8 44678 3.86 1.06
P-9 44611 3.64 1.29
P-10 44560 3.48 1.22
(Continued)
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cut-off point of 0.90 is recommended for the GFI and AGFI [34]. A bi-factor model using the
original item structure detailed in the DIT-2 Guide fitted our dataset better (see Table 2).
When an acceptable model fit was found, the next step was to determine significant param-
eter estimates. Unfortunately, we could not calculate the t value which is calculated by dividing
the parameter estimate by the standard error. This was because ULS estimation did not pro-
duce standard errors [29]. Tables 3 and 4 describe the standardized factor loadings from the
CFA and bi-factor model. Each item belonged to each schema well using a 3-factor CFA
model and all factor loadings except those for four MN items (MN1, 2, 12, and 17), which
were greater than 0.3 on the CFA. The hypothesis tests for factor loadings were not performed
because the ULS estimation did not report the t-test results for parameters (see Table 3).
For the bi-factor model, most factor loadings of P items were higher on Factor G (SGMJ)
than on Factor 3 (P). Ten MN items among 17 items had higher factor loadings on Factor 2
(MN) than Factor G (SGMJ), four MN items had lower factor loadings on Factor 2 than Factor
G and three items had similar factor loadings between Factor G and MN. All factor loadings of
PI items except three items (PI-12 to PI-14) on Factor 1 (PI) were much higher than Factor G’s
factor loadings.
We focused on items that reported standardized factor loadings on Factor G greater than
0.30, which has been regarded as a threshold for a meaningful factor loading [35,36]. The fac-
tor loadings of all P items exceeded this threshold (see Table 4 for the factor loading in the bi-
factor model). In addition, two PI (PI-12 and PI-14) and three MN items (MN-5, MN-7, and
MN-14) reported factor loadings greater than this threshold. As presented, interestingly, Fac-
tor G, SGMJ, was positively associated with PI and MN items although Kohlbergian and Neo-
Kohlbergian theorists have assumed that the utilization of the postconventional schema indi-
cates moral judgment development. In addition, in the bi-factor model, as shown in Table 4,
all P items showed strong factor loadings on Factor G, while their factor loading on Factor 3
(P) became very small.
In addition, as a way to examine how each item is associated with the N2 score, we con-
ducted correlation analysis. The resultant correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5. Con-
sistent with the results from the bi-factor CFA, all P items were significantly associated with
the N2 score, while several non-P items (i.e., PI-12, PI-14, MN-5, MN-7, MN-14) that reported
significant factor loadings (see Table 4) also showed significant correlation.
Table 1. (Continued)
Item n Mean SD
P-11 44627 4.05 1.09
P-12 44431 3.66 1.20
P-13 44476 3.54 1.20
P-14 44448 3.25 1.29
Total 44742 165.86 19.94
Item scores range from 1 = No to 5 = great.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.t001
Table 2. Goodness-of-fit indices for DIT-2 (N = 39,409).
Model RMSR SRMSR GFI AGFI
CFA 0.10 0.07 0.85 0.84
Bi-factor model 0.08 0.06 0.91 0.89
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.t002
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Table 3. Standardized factor loadings from a 3-factor confirmatory factor analysis.
Item Factor 1 (PI) Factor 2 (MN) Factor 3 (P)
PI-1 0.387
PI-2 0.393
PI-3 0.381
PI-4 0.347
PI-5 0.357
PI-6 0.399
PI-7 0.313
PI-8 0.350
PI-9 0.462
PI-10 0.405
PI-11 0.386
PI-12 0.365
PI-13 0.329
PI-14 0.367
PI-15 0.411
PI-16 0.460
PI-17 0.421
PI-18 0.432
PI-19 0.448
PI-20 0.384
MN-1 0.221
MN-2 0.278
MN-3 0.371
MN-4 0.429
MN-5 0.492
MN-6 0.452
MN-7 0.356
MN-8 0.400
MN-9 0.380
MN-10 0.368
MN-11 0.411
MN-12 0.250
MN-13 0.386
MN-14 0.392
MN-15 0.313
MN-16 0.316
MN-17 0.294
P-1 0.357
P-2 0.462
P-3 0.411
P-4 0.530
P-5 0.462
P-6 0.542
P-7 0.450
P-8 0.461
P-9 0.515
P-10 0.505
(Continued)
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Discussion
In general, we found that the bi-factor model reported a better model fit compared with the
ordinary three-factor model in our CFA. These results suggest that the overall development of
moral judgment can be better explained in terms of SGMJ that is represented by Factor G,
rather than preferences on specific individual schemas that were represented by the three
latent factors, PI, MN, and P. Also, the results support the soft-stage model, which constitutes
the conceptual basis of the DIT-2, as proposed by Neo-Kohlbergians. Most factor loadings of P
items were higher on Factor G (SGMJ) than on Factor 3 (P) in the bi-factor model. It supports
the assumption that Factor G describes the unidimensional continuous moral judgment devel-
opment. This might be because the postconventional schema, or the most developmentally
advanced form of moral reasoning [1,3,4] is highly correlated with advanced cognitive devel-
opment [1,3,4,23,24].
In addition, two PI and three MN items also showed significant factor loadings on Factor G
in addition to all P items, so Factor G seemed to at least partially take into account PI and MN
schemas in addition to the P schema. These five items showed significant positive correlation
with the N2 score (see Table 5), which indicates the overall moral judgment development in
Neo-Kohlbergian framework, unlike other PI and MN items. The N2 score incorporates all
three schemas in its calculation and is based on the soft-stage model that assumes the gradual
and incremental transitions across schemas instead of radical moves. Hence, the association
between these five items and SGMJ may suggest that the bi-factor model and concept of SGMJ
can show us how the soft-stage model is supported by evidence, although not all PI and MN
items were associated with SGMJ. The nature of these five specific PI and MN items perhaps
contributed to their significant association with SGMJ, unlike the other PI and MN items, so
further details regarding these individual items will be discussed later in this section. Although
the factor loadings of P items on the P factor diminished in the bi-factor model, the result does
not necessarily suggest that the postconventional schema is not fundamental in explaining
moral judgment development. Because all P items showed significant factor loadings on Factor
G, and Factor G was fundamentally explained by P items, postconventional moral reasoning
might constitute the basis of developed SGMJ and the explanation of moral judgment develop-
ment in general. Given the better model fit indicators from the bi-factor model compared with
the ordinary CFA model, and the strong factor loading of P items on Factor G, the soft-stage
concept proposed in the Neo-Kohlbergian model can be better supported by evidence.
Moreover, in terms of the nature of the collected samples, these results could be interpreted
based on the nature of the participants in the present study and prior research in moral devel-
opment. We collected data from college students, who were situated within late adolescence to
Table 3. (Continued)
Item Factor 1 (PI) Factor 2 (MN) Factor 3 (P)
P-11 0.552
P-12 0.556
P-13 0.458
P-14 0.476
Correlations among Factors
Factor PI MN P
PI 1.000
MN 0.364 1.000
P 0.245 0.521 1.000
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.t003
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Table 4. Standardized factor loadings from a bi-factor model.
Item Factor 1 (PI) Factor 2 (MN) Factor 3 (P) Factor G (SGMJ)
PI-1 0.516 -0.072
PI-2 0.389 0.111
PI-3 0.287 0.229
PI-4 0.296 0.175
PI-5 0.471 -0.088
PI-6 0.501 -0.057
PI-7 0.269 0.126
PI-8 0.401 0.011
PI-9 0.453 0.107
PI-10 0.550 -0.102
PI-11 0.317 0.166
PI-12 0.140 0.418
PI-13 0.161 0.280
PI-14 0.198 0.353
PI-15 0.375 0.180
PI-16 0.525 -0.015
PI-17 0.454 0.011
PI-18 0.424 0.116
PI-19 0.455 0.062
PI-20 0.316 0.210
MN-1 0.394 0.046
MN-2 0.172 0.197
MN-3 0.295 0.195
MN-4 0.268 0.255
MN-5 0.296 0.322
MN-6 0.301 0.259
MN-7 0.137 0.308
MN-8 0.184 0.285
MN-9 0.285 0.213
MN-10 0.152 0.283
MN-11 0.486 0.163
MN-12 0.435 0.014
MN-13 0.505 0.125
MN-14 0.058 0.463
MN-15 0.335 0.058
MN-16 0.481 0.052
MN-17 0.581 0.000
P-1 0.034 0.336
P-2 0.494 0.398
P-3 0.401 0.338
P-4 0.089 0.521
P-5 0.050 0.437
P-6 0.038 0.570
P-7 0.064 0.415
P-8 0.087 0.448
P-9 0.079 0.520
P-10 0.074 0.499
(Continued)
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emerging adulthood and likely to experience a transition from the conventional to postcon-
ventional moral thinking [4]. According to Kohlbergian theory, young college students are
likely to temporally employ seemingly concrete individualistic and relativistic moral thinking
that is similar to pre-conventional moral thinking before transitioning to the postconventional
level [37,38]. Their responses suggest that they are attempting to integrate moral values into
their own belief systems while dealing with internal conflicts and reflecting upon existing
social norms to advance to the postconventional moral thinking. Such a trend is not necessar-
ily evidence of the real retrogression of the development of moral judgment [37].
Thus, given that the majority of our participants were college students and likely to experi-
ence the aforementioned process explained by Kohlberg and Kramer [37], our participants
might carefully consider and value several PI items and such PI items might show significant
association with Factor G. Furthermore, because participants were experiencing a transition
between the conventional to postconventional moral thinking [4], several MN items might
Table 4. (Continued)
Item Factor 1 (PI) Factor 2 (MN) Factor 3 (P) Factor G (SGMJ)
P-11 0.092 0.532
P-12 0.251 0.509
P-13 0.172 0.422
P-14 -0.003 0.489
Bolded factor loadings on Factor G indicate factor loadings greater than the set threshold of .30.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.t004
Table 5. Spearman correlations between N2 score and individual items.
Item rs Item rs Item rs
PI-1 -.359�� MN-1 .034�� P-1 .331��
PI-2 -.207�� MN-2 .054�� P-2 .404��
PI-3 -.083�� MN-3 .031�� P-3 .366��
PI-4 -.085�� MN-4 .046�� P-4 .469��
PI-5 -.333�� MN-5 .114�� P-5 .325��
PI-6 -.327�� MN-6 .056�� P-6 .428��
PI-7 -.126�� MN-7 .097�� P-7 .322��
PI-8 -.228�� MN-8 .037�� P-8 .371��
PI-9 -.212�� MN-9 -.055�� P-9 .419��
PI-10 -.324�� MN-10 -.012� P-10 .366��
PI-11 -.111�� MN-11 -.076�� P-11 .432��
PI-12 .108�� MN-12 -.128�� P-12 .449��
PI-13 -.084�� MN-13 -.010� P-13 .328��
PI-14 .034�� MN-14 .233�� P-14 .369��
PI-15 -.052�� MN-15 -.232��
PI-16 -.318�� MN-16 -.120��
PI-17 -.328�� MN-17 -.138��
PI-18 -.158��
PI-19 -.233��
PI-20 -.028��
� p< .05
�� p< .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238110.t005
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also be seriously considered and show significant factor loadings on Factor G. As mentioned
earlier, our factor analysis was performed at the item level and took into account all individual
items, so it follows that our results will differ from those in the calculation of N2 scores, which
utilize only four rank-ordered items per story. Because Factor G, SGMJ, was examined based
on all individual items, the calculated factor loadings on SGMJ suggest that even participants
with sophisticated moral judgment might also show partial preference for several non-P items,
two PI and three MN items, in addition to P items.
We may also tentatively consider a possible association between Factor G and practical wis-
dom, phronesis, proposed in the Aristotelian theoretical framework. Phronesis enables one to
choose the most appropriate solution in a dilemmatic situation [39,40]. It is an intellectual vir-
tue to seek an optimal solution, so it is plausible to expect a positive association between phron-
esis and the P schema. However, according to Aristotelian virtue ethics, phronesis requires
balancing diverse values and viewpoints that might also embrace communal, relational, and
interdependent aspects that might not be fully captured by the P schema [41–43]. Thus, several
PI and MN items, which seemingly were associated with the aforementioned communal, rela-
tional, and interdependent values, show significant factor loadings (> .3) on Factor G in the
dataset. However, because we only employed the DIT-2 based on the Neo-Kohlbergian frame-
work and did not directly test the association between moral judgment and wisdom, our inter-
pretation from the Aristotelian perspective is tentative.
Furthermore, we found several interesting points in the reported factor loadings. As
reported in Table 4, we found that several non-P items (i.e., PI-12. PI-14. MN-5, MN-7, MN-
14) showed significant associations with the SGMJ, the Factor G. To consider the implications
of these findings, we reviewed the nature of the aforementioned two PI (PI-12 and PI-14) and
three MN items (MN-5, MN-7, and MN-14). The two PI items were concerned mainly with
communal values (PI-12) or relational values (PI-14). In the cases of the three MN items, MN-
5 seemed to be associated with the harmony in a community. MN-7 was seemingly concerned
about the maintenance of communal order (e.g., laws), and MN-14 was related to one’s rights
in the relation with a community.
Compared with the other PI and MN items that were more about one’s self-interest and
social norms and conventions, respectively, these five items were more related to the welfare of
other human beings and their rights in society. Hence, we could consider that these items
address basic moral concerns in human and social relations, not one’s own interests or social
norms per se that are represented in other PI and MN items, and are likely to show the higher
factor loadings and higher correlation with the N2 score. These items are perhaps more
strongly associated with SGMJ because they would better examine the gradual transition from
person- (PI) or social-oriented morality (MN) to principled morality (P) while the other PI
and MN items might be less related to morality. In addition, the phrasing of the five items
might also contribute to their significant association with the N2 score. These items seemed to
imply moral philosophical ideas that were slightly more advanced than their respective levels.
For instance, the phrasing of two PI items was about responsibility and empathic concern and
three MN items were phrased in a way that required participants to consider the actors’ rights
and responsibilities instead of explicit laws or norms. Because phrases used in these items
addressed ones’ rights and obligations, which might be associated more with moral principles
represented in the P schema than with personal values (PI) or laws or norms (MN), they per-
haps showed a significant association with the N2 score. These anomalies may also be the
result of the age/developmental level of the sample—it is more restricted than the full range
(adolescent-adult) and perhaps these items were interpreted in a different way—that is, they
read into the items.
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Interestingly, when we examined how each item’s rating was associated with the overall
postconventional moral judgment in terms of N2 scores, we found that ratings on the afore-
mentioned PI and MN items were positively correlated with N2 scores while all P items were
positively correlated with N2 scores as expected (see Table 5). When we examined the correla-
tion, PI-12 and PI-14 showed the highest positive correlation coefficients with N2 scores
among all PI items, and MN-5, MN-7, and MN-14 did so among all MN items (see Table 5).
Because the N2 score is calculated with only four rank-ordered items per story [2], it would be
difficult to examine whether and how items other than these four items per story are assessed
and valued by participants. In fact, although participants can score more than five items as
“5 = great” in a certain story, only four items would be included in calculating their N2 scores.
For instance, a hypothetical participant who selected all P items for the rank-order questions
might receive an ideal N2 score, but the participant could also mark some PI and MN items as
“5 = great”. The CFA with all individual items that we performed would enable us to examine
the relationship between moral judgment in general, SGMJ in our study, and the individual
items that could not be understood with the N2 scores. Given that the five items showed the
highest correlation coefficients with N2 scores within their schema categories, PI and MN,
they were likely to show significant factor loadings on Factor G. Moreover, these five PI and
MN items might be the most preferred PI and MN items among participants with relatively
more developed judgment.
However, some limitations warrant future research. First, the present factor analyses are
based on undergraduate college students only, but it could prove fruitful to investigate the
internal factor structure of the DIT-2 for different populations, such as high school students
and graduate students. Second, only rating items were used for this validity study, although
DIT-2 reports N2 scores calculated from both ratings and rankings [14]. Third, there are some
low and weak correlations between items, which is possibly due to college students being in
transition in their use of moral judgment developmental schemas. When a heterogeneous pop-
ulation including middle, high school, and graduate level students is analyzed, the correlation
might increase.
In conclusion, a bi-factor model using the original item structure in the manual would be
proposed for undergraduate populations. A simpler model, CFA, was also considered to evalu-
ate the internal structure of DIT-2 scale. The greater than 0.3 factor loadings for all 51 items,
except four MN items, indicated that our internal structure from the DIT-2 manual worked
well using the CFA. For the bi-factor model, the most P items were loaded more on Factor G
(SGMJ) than on Factor 3 (P). We concluded that a DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the inter-
nal structure of moral reasoning development from both CFA and bi-factor models. In addi-
tion, we attempted to interpret the meaning of the finding, the presence of Factor G and its
significant association with several PI and MN items, with prior research on moral judgment
development.
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